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MEDICAL MALPRACTICE OVERSEAS: 
THE LEGAL UNCERTAINTY 
SURROUNDING MEDICAL TOURISM 
PHILIP MIRRER-SINGER* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Recently, waves of people from developed countries have been traveling to 
places like India, Brazil, Thailand, and Malaysia for medical procedures ranging 
from face lifts to knee replacements to cardiac bypass surgery.1 Cities in these 
countries have opened up private hospitals that cater specifically to foreigners 
and that are often staffed by Western-trained physicians.2 These hospitals 
charge patients a fraction of what they would pay for similar services in the 
West and, in some cases, offer procedures that have yet to be approved in 
developed countries.3 
This latest form of outsourcing is called “medical tourism,” and industry 
experts believe it has the potential to bring over $2 billion a year to India alone
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 1. One hundred fifty thousand foreigners visited India for medical procedures in 2003, and a 
health-care specialist with the Confederation of Indian Industry predicted that the business would grow 
at a rate of fifteen percent per year.  John Lancaster, Surgeries, Side Trips for “Medical Tourists”: 
Affordable Care at India’s Private Hospitals Draws Growing Number of Foreigners, WASH. POST, Oct. 
21, 2004, at A01. 
 2. The Apollo Hospital in Chennai, India and the Bumrungrad Hospital in Thailand are two such 
examples.  See, e.g., 60 Minutes Story: Vacation, Adventure, and Surgery? (CBS Broadcast, Apr. 24, 
2005), available at www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/04/21/60minutes/main689998.shtml. 
 3. Patients at Bumrungrad Hospital in Thailand pay about one-eighth of what they would pay in 
the United States.  60 Minutes Story, supra note 2. 
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by 2012.4 The demand for medical tourism is not surprising, given that millions 
of Americans remain uninsured and that citizens needing medical attention in 
Western European countries face long waiting periods. In the United States, 
private firms have begun to reap some of the profits of this budding business by 
offering prospective medical tourists all-inclusive packages in which a hospital 
stay in an exotic location is built around trips to the Taj Mahal or sandy 
beaches.5 In the United Kingdom, the National Health Service may even 
subcontract patient cases to India.6 
Even though medical tourism has received an increasing amount of 
attention from the media, there has been remarkably little commentary about 
medical tourists who have fallen victim to medical malpractice abroad. For 
these unlucky patients, a website for India’s largest medical-tourism hospital, 
Apollo, presents a grim message: “A prospective medical tourist should also be 
aware of possible legal issues. There is presently no international legal 
regulation of medical tourism. All medical procedures have an element of risk. 
The issue of legal recourse for unsatisfactory treatment across international 
boundaries is a legally undefined issue at present.”7 
This article explores some of the legal uncertainty surrounding medical 
tourism—specifically, ways medical tourists can seek relief in U.S. courts for 
malpractice committed abroad. It concludes, however, that medical tourists face 
substantial hurdles in obtaining such relief. 
Part II explains why courts probably lack jurisdiction over foreign 
physicians who have allegedly committed malpractice and discusses theories 
under which U.S. firms in the medical-tourism business could be held liable for 
the foreign provider’s negligence. Part III discusses additional barriers to 
malpractice actions against firms, such as forum non conveniens and conflict-of-
law issues. Part IV presents the arguments for and against holding firms 
vicariously liable for the negligence of foreign providers. The article concludes 
by noting that legislation may be necessary to deal with the complex policy 
issues medical tourism presents. 
II 
OPTIONS FOR LEGAL RECOURSE: WHOM TO SUE, WHAT THEORY? 
A. Suing the Foreign Provider: The Personal Jurisdiction Problem 
If a medical-tourism plaintiff brought an action against her overseas 
 
 4. See Randeep Ramesh, This UK Patient Avoided Waiting Lists and Flew to India for a Heart 
Bypass. Is Health Tourism the Future?  THE GUARDIAN (London), Feb. 1, 2005, at Guardian Home 
Pages 3 (citing a joint report by McKinsey and the Confederation of Indian Industry). 
 5. See, e.g., Med Journeys, http://www.medjourneys.com (last visited May 27, 2007); 
PlanetHospital, http://www.PlanetHospital.com (last visited Apr. 10, 2007). 
 6. See Ramesh, supra note 4. 
 7. India Profile, Medical Insurance and Legal Aspects, http://www.indiaprofile.com/medical-
tourism/medical-insurance-and-legal-aspects.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2007). 
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provider in the United States, she would need to convince the court where she 
filed suit that it had personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant.  The 
personal jurisdiction requirement may prove to be problematic for medical-
tourism plaintiffs.  Courts are generally reluctant to assert jurisdiction over 
physicians who neither reside nor practice in the state where the court sits (the 
forum state).8 The traditional notion that physicians have a “localized practice” 
remains pervasive and consequently courts often find that nonresident 
physicians do not intend for their services to have an impact beyond the state in 
which they practice. 9 
 
1. Jurisdiction over Foreign Physicians Based on Their Transacting 
Business Within the Forum State 
One way a medical-tourism plaintiff might try to overcome the personal 
jurisdictional hurdle is to sue in a state where the foreign provider does 
business. Many states have long-arm statutes that permit their courts to exercise 
personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants who “transact business” in 
the state or who regularly “solicit business” in the state while committing a tort 
without the state that causes injury to a person in the state.10 Such provisions 
could be triggered if the foreign provider solicited patients in the forum state or 
patients came through referrals provided by U.S. medical-tourism firms within 
the state. 
Even with a helpful long-arm statute, however, medical-tourism plaintiffs 
would still face an uphill battle on the jurisdictional front.  Courts typically find 
that the transacting or soliciting business provisions of a long-arm statute are 
insufficient to confer them with jurisdiction over nonresident physicians who 
treat forum-state residents.11 Nor can such provisions suffice for jurisdiction 
over nonresident physicians who accept referrals from forum-state physicians 
and HMOs. For example, in Ingraham v. Carroll,12 the New York Court of 
Appeals held it lacked jurisdiction over a Vermont physician even though he 
received frequent referrals from a New York HMO. Similarly, in Nicholas v. 
Ashraf, 13 a federal district court in  Pennsylvania held it had no jurisdiction over 
two West Virginia physicians who had accepted referrals from Pennsylvania 
physicians. 
 
 8. See, e.g., Grove v. Maheswaran, 498 S.E.2d 485, 508 (W. Va. 1997) (holding that there were 
insufficient contacts between the nonresident third party defendants—physicians and a hospital to 
support West Virginia’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over them); Biggs v. Robert Thomas, O.D., 
Inc., 893 P.2d 545, 548  (Or. Ct. App. 1995), rev. den., 901 P.2d 246 (Or. 1995) (holding that the 
defendant, a California optometrist who practiced only in California, did not purposefully direct his 
activities at the residents of Oregon and therefore the court lacked jurisdiction over the defendant). 
 9. Wright v. Yackley, 459 F.2d 287, 290 (9th Cir. 1972) (finding that “there is no systematic or 
continuing effort on the part of the doctor to provide services which are to be felt in the forum state” 
when the physician practiced elsewhere). 
 10. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302 (a)(1) and (a)(3)(i) (2001 & Supp. 2007). 
 11. E.g., Mosier v. Kinley, 702 A.2d 803, 808 (N.H. 1997). 
 12. 687 N.E.2d 1293, 1295–96 (N.Y. 1997). 
 13. 655 F. Supp. 1418, 1419 (W.D. Pa. 1987). 
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In rare cases, however, courts have employed the transacting business 
provision to assert jurisdiction over nonresident physicians whose relationships 
with health-care providers in the forum state is well established and ongoing. 
For example, in McLenithan v. Bennington Community Health Plan, a New 
York appellate court held it had jurisdiction over a Vermont physician because 
the physician had “interjected himself into New York’s service economy” by 
contracting with a New York HMO whose subscribers were mainly New York 
residents.14 
The holding in McLenithan has not been affirmed by the New York Court 
of Appeals but it may be helpful to medical-tourism plaintiffs’ jurisdictional 
arguments. Invoking McLenithan, plaintiffs could argue that their foreign 
physicians subjected themselves to jurisdiction in the forum state by having 
ongoing relationships with medical-tourism firms based in that state. 
2. Jurisdiction over Foreign Physicians Based on the Continuing-Tort 
Theory 
Another option is for medical-tourism plaintiffs to sue in the state they 
return to after receiving the overseas medical operation—typically their home 
state.  Under the traditional view, a forum state does not have jurisdiction over 
a nonresident physician simply because the plaintiff resides there.  Indeed, 
courts have held that the place where the patient resides is inconsequential in a 
jurisdictional inquiry because medical services are “directed to no place but to 
the needy person herself.”15 However, medical-tourism plaintiffs may be able to 
sue in their home states if the courts where they bring their actions recognize 
the “continuing tort” theory of jurisdiction. Under this theory, a plaintiff’s 
home state court can exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident physician 
whenever  the effects of the physician’s  tortious act continues to be felt by the 
plaintiff upon returning to her home state.16 Unless the plaintiff has a continuing 
relationship with the nonresident physician, however, courts have been 
reluctant to accept the continuing-tort theory.17 For example, the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit strongly condemned the continuing-tort theory in 
Wright v. Yackley: the “idea that tortious rendition of such [medical] services is 
a portable tort which can be deemed to have been committed wherever the 
consequences foreseeably were felt is wholly inconsistent with the public 
interest in having services of this sort generally available.”18 
 
 14. 223 A.D.2d 777, 778 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996). See also Ingraham, where the New York Court of 
Appeals declined to decide whether a contract like that in McLenithan—a “referral/fee arrangement 
creating mutual obligations”—would suffice as “interstate business activity” for purposes of long-arm 
jurisdiction. 
 15. Wright v. Yackley, 459 F.2d 287, 289 (9th Cir. 1972).  
 16. See, e.g., Torres v. State, 894 P.2d 386, 390 (N.M. 1995). 
 17. See, e.g., Wright, 459 F.2d at 289–90 (holding that refilling a prescription for a resident of the 
forum state is insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction); see also Kennedy v. Ziesmann, 526 F. 
Supp. 1328, 1330–31 (E.D. Ky. 1981) (holding that “incidental phone calls” to a patient in the forum 
state are insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction). 
 18. 459 F.2d at 289–90. 
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3. The Jurisdiction Problem and Public Policy 
The court in Wright rejected the continuing-tort theory primarily on public 
policy grounds. The court reasoned that forcing physicians to defend 
themselves in a foreign state could inhibit the provision of medical care for 
nonresidents.19 Moreover, the court opined that the interest in physician access 
for its citizens when they travel out of state trumps any additional deterrence of 
malpractice that might be gained by asserting jurisdiction over nonresident 
physicians: “[A] state’s dominant interest on behalf of its citizens in such a case 
as this is not that they should be free from injury by out-of-state doctors, but 
rather that they should be able to secure adequate medical services to meet 
their needs wherever they may go.”20 
In the medical-tourism context, however, the policy arguments advanced by 
the court in Wright may not apply with equal force. The plaintiff’s home state 
has a much stronger interest in deterring foreign medical malpractice than in 
deterring malpractice in other states because, for example, a Kansas court can 
rely on the Missouri courts to punish negligent doctors, but it cannot always 
place so much faith in foreign legal systems. 
B. Medical-Tourism Firms 
The idea of going abroad for surgery is daunting, and many prospective 
medical tourists look for professional guidance to the process. Private 
companies in the United States have stepped in to fill this void by offering to 
work out all the details for medical tourists. A good example is MedRetreat, 
“the first U.S. based medical tourism service agent facilitating the health care 
needs and travel desire of Americans.”21 MedRetreat has created a “network of 
pre-qualified hospitals” from which clients choose.22 According to the managing 
director of MedRetreat, this list was created by spending “several hundred 
thousand dollars in research” and traveling to developing countries to “inspect 
and verify the quality of healthcare facilities abroad.”23 MedRetreat marketing 
materials tell prospective clients to rely on its expertise in identifying reputable 
foreign providers: 
Our team of medical tourism experts have personally visited 5 continents from the 
perspective of a medical tourist and will be happy to discuss the pros and cons of any 
destination that you are interested in. They have conducted comprehensive research, 
performed site inspections of the hospitals and hotels and have interviewed the 
 
 19. Id. at 290–91. 
 20. Id. at 291. 
 21. MedRetreat, http://www.MedRetreat.com (follow “About MedRetreat[:] Getting to know us” 
hyperlink to view slide presentation) (last visited Apr. 10, 2007). 
 22. MedRetreat Press Release, Nov. 18, 2005, available at http://www.medretreat.com/templates/ 
UserFiles/Documents/Press%20Releases/MedRetreatPressRelease20051118.pdf. 
 23. Id. 
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surgeons and medical staff to verify that they are the world-class institutions they 
promote themselves to be.24 
For medical tourists who want to file malpractice claims in the United 
States, medical-tourism firms make attractive defendants because they are not 
encumbered with personal jurisdiction problems that might protect negligent 
foreign physicians. A firm that is incorporated in or has its principal place of 
business in a particular state is always subject to that state’s jurisdiction.25 
Consequently, medical-tourism plaintiffs might try to hold the medical-tourism 
firms they used liable for including foreign providers who were negligent on 
their network. 
Plaintiffs could invoke a number of theories to hold medical-tourism firms 
liable, including corporate negligence, the informed consent doctrine, and 
vicarious liability.  However, none of these theories fit perfectly in the medical 
tourism context. 
1. Corporate Negligence 
Firms are liable for the torts they commit, including corporate negligence. 
Under corporate-negligence theory, hospitals have been held liable for 
negligently hiring or retaining incompetent physicians or for failing to 
adequately supervise them.26 However, courts have been hesitant to extend the 
theory outside the hospital context. As a result, courts have not uniformly 
applied the theory to managed care organizations (MCOs).27 
Courts that refuse to hold MCOs liable for corporate negligence would 
probably also refuse to apply that theory to firms selling medical-tourism 
packages. Firms are more like MCOs than hospitals. Like MCOs, firms ask 
their clients to select surgeons from a network of foreign providers. Unlike 
hospitals, firms have no staff physicians, physician assistants, or nurses. 
Even those courts willing to hold MCOs liable under a corporate-negligence 
theory may decline to apply the theory to medical-tourism firms. A court 
hearing a medical-tourism case would probably apply the law of the country in 
which the alleged malpractice took place, and that country might not recognize 
the corporate-negligence theory.28 
 
 24. See MedRetreat, Why MedRetreat, http://www.medretreat.com/medical_tourism/why_ 
medretreat.html (last visited May 27, 2007). 
 25. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(c)(1) (2006). 
 26. See, e.g., Darling v. Charleston Cmty. Mem. Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253, 258 (Ill. 1965). 
 27. For examples of cases on both sides of the issue of whether MCOs can be held liable for 
corporate negligence, see Clark C. Havighurst, Making Health Plans Accountable For the Quality of 
Care, 31 GA. L. REV. 587, 609 n.58 (1997).  Among other cases, Havighurst cites Elsesser v. Hospital of 
Philadelphia College of Osteopathic Medicine, 802 F. Supp. 1286, 1291 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (recognizing 
corporate negligence as a theory of liability); Harrell v. Total Health Care, Inc., 781 S.W.2d 58, 60 (Mo. 
1989) (relying on a state statute to reject the theory of liability); and McClellan v. HMO of 
Pennsylvania, 604 A.2d 1053, 1056 n.6 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (finding it unnecessary to decide the case 
on the issue). 
 28. See infra Part III. 
13__MIRRER-SINGER.DOC 08/08/2007  9:36 AM 
Spring 2007] MEDICAL MALPRACTICE OVERSEAS 217 
Corporate negligence is also difficult to prove. If the plaintiff pursues a 
negligent-retention claim, she must first prove that the physician was unfit or 
incompetent.29 Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the firm should have 
known of the physician’s incompetence.30 That the plaintiff was negligently 
operated on does not itself satisfy the scienter requirement.31  Rather, the 
plaintiff must establish a pattern of misconduct by the physician.32 
A medical-tourism plaintiff would encounter additional problems in 
pursuing a negligent-hiring claim.  In the United States, a prima facie case of 
negligent hiring can be made out if the physician has not passed her medical 
boards. It is unclear, however, what credentials a physician in a developing 
country must have before a U.S. firm may place her on its network. 
A claim for negligent supervision would be no easier to prove. For that 
claim to apply, a plaintiff must show either that adequate supervision would 
have prevented the physician’s negligence or that “prompt action after the 
incident would have minimized injuries.”33 As Catherine Butler notes with 
respect to actions against preferred provider organizations, the standard for 
negligent supervision presents difficult proximate cause issues.34  Medical-
tourism plaintiffs would be hard-pressed to show that more oversight by the 
medical-tourism firm would have prevented the foreign provider’s negligence. 
2. Informed Consent 
Given the difficulties with proving corporate negligence, medical-tourism 
plaintiffs may be better off pursuing a lack of informed consent claim. Firms go 
to great lengths to vouch for the quality of care their clients will receive.35 If the 
quality of care proves to be substandard, a case can be made that the vouching 
amounted to misrepresentation, and, as a consequence of such 
misrepresentation, that the plaintiff did not give her informed consent to the 
operation. 
Yet there are pitfalls to a lack of informed consent claim as well.  Courts 
have been reluctant to apply the informed consent doctrine beyond the treating 
physician.36  Moreover, the informed consent cases involving misrepresentations 
 
 29. Edmonds v. Chamberlain Mem. Hosp., 629 S.W.2d 28, 29–30 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 30. 
 32. See Havighurst, supra note 27, at 604 (“[A] hospital is accountable for such a physician’s 
performance only if it was, or should have been, aware of a specific problem—much as, in many 
jurisdictions, a dog owner is entitled to one free bite.”). 
 33. Catherine Butler, Note and Comment, Preferred Provider Organization Liability for Physician 
Malpractice, 11 AM. J.L. & MED. 345, 361 (1985). 
 34. Id. 
 35. MedRetreat, for example, states that all MedRetreat partner facilities are “private institutions 
that either meet or exceed the high standards of quality care, technological innovation and 
accreditation that American medicine is known for.” MedRetreat, Hospitals, 
http://www.medretreat.com/procedures/hospitals.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2007). 
 36. E.g., Foflygen v. Zemel, 615 A.2d 1345, 1353 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (“[U]nder normal 
circumstances, only the physician who performed the operation on the patient has the duty of obtaining 
the patient’s informed consent.”). 
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tend to focus on misrepresentations concerning the surgery’s chances of success 
and the risks accompanying the surgery.37 Although these causes of action 
would be applicable in a medical-tourism case, were such representations to be 
made, prudent firms would shy away from making such promises. The basis of a 
medical tourist’s claim would most likely lie in a firm’s misrepresentations 
about the qualifications of the foreign providers. 
A small number of courts have allowed a plaintiff to bring an action against 
her physician when the physician misrepresented her credentials or experience. 
In Howard v. University of Medicine & Dentistry of New Jersey,38 the New 
Jersey Supreme Court recognized a cause of action lying in lack of informed 
consent based on a physician’s misrepresentations about her credentials or 
experience. It held that physicians do not have a duty to disclose their 
credentials but that a “significant misrepresentation” concerning their 
experience can affect the validity of their patients’ consents.39 
The court in Howard sharply limited the misrepresentation theory of 
liability, however, by establishing a demanding two-part test that plaintiffs must 
meet to get their cases to a jury. First, a plaintiff must show that an “objectively 
reasonable person could find that physician experience was material in 
determining the medical risk” of the procedure.40 In order to meet the 
materiality prong, the plaintiff must prove that the physician’s lack of 
experience had a “direct and demonstrable relationship to the harm” the 
patient suffered.41 If the materiality prong is met, the plaintiff must then show 
that a reasonably prudent person in the plaintiff’s position would not have 
consented to the surgery after being informed of the defendant’s true 
credentials.42 
It would be difficult for a medical-tourism plaintiff to meet these 
requirements for a misrepresentation claim. First, the plaintiff would have to 
establish that there was an actual misrepresentation. In Howard, the plaintiff 
alleged that the neurosurgeon lied about being board-certified in neurosurgery 
and about performing sixty corpectomies a year.43 The representations on the 
 
 37. E.g., Salis v. United States, 522 F. Supp. 989, 1005 (M.D. Pa. 1981) (recognizing a cause of 
action in lack of informed consent when the injured plaintiff was not warned of all the dangers of an 
angiogram); Wagner v. Georgetown Univ. Med. Ctr., 768 A.2d 546, 560–61 (D.C. 2001) (finding error 
in granting the defendant’s motion in limine in part, because a reasonable jury could conclude that the 
plaintiff’s physician had overestimated the odds of surgical success and therefore the plaintiff did not 
give her informed consent). 
 38. 800 A.2d 73, 82, 86 (N.J. 2002); see also Johnson v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495, 504 (Wis. 1996) 
(“We reject the defendant’s proposed bright line rule that it is error as a matter of law to admit 
evidence in an informed consent case that the physician failed to inform the patient regarding the 
physician’s experience with the surgery or treatment at issue.”). 
 39. Id. at 83, 86. Interestingly, the Howard court did not permit an action for fraud. For a critique 
on this point see Vincent R. Johnson and Shawn M. Lovorn, Misrepresentations by Lawyers About 
Credentials or Experience, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 529, 569–70 (2004). 
 40. Howard, 800 A.2d at 84. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 76. 
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medical-tourism firms’ websites are probably not false, although some may be 
misleading. For example, until March 2007, MedRetreat’s website stated that all 
the physicians it partners with are “board[-]certified MD[]s, trained according 
to the same standards and practices as those operating in The United States.”44 
Such language might create a misimpression if the foreign physicians have not 
received the same rigorous training as physicians in the United States, but it is 
probably not specific enough to rise to misrepresentation.45 
A medical-tourism plaintiff would also struggle to prove the materiality 
prong since courts would be reluctant to judge foreign medical training. For 
example, a medical tourist may claim that the firm she used misled her into 
thinking that her foreign physician had the same qualifications as a U.S. 
physician. In order to clear the materiality hurdle, the plaintiff would then have 
to show that the physician’s non-U.S. credentials increased the risk of harm 
from surgery. A court might not be willing to hold that foreign training is 
inferior to the training physicians receive in the United States. 
3. Vicarious Liability 
Alternatively, a medical-tourism plaintiff could seek to hold the medical-
tourism firm vicariously liable for the negligence of the foreign provider. Courts 
are willing to hold defendants vicariously liable only in specific circumstances, 
such as when there is an employer–employee relationship and the employee 
commits a tort within the scope of that relationship. Vicarious liability in such 
circumstances is based on the principle of respondeat superior. Under the same 
principle, courts have held hospitals vicariously liable for the negligence of their 
staff physicians46 and staff-model HMOs liable for the negligence of plan 
doctors.47 
Vicarious liability based on respondeat superior would probably not apply 
in medical-tourism cases. Foreign providers act more like independent 
contractors than like employees of U.S. medical-tourism firms: the firms do not 
pay the wages of the foreign providers, foreign providers treat patients other 
than those referred to them by the firms, and foreign providers choose their 
own staffs. 
Courts have also been willing to use apparent- or ostensible-agency theories 
to hold hospitals vicariously liable for the negligence of physicians who are 
independent contractors rather than staff physicians. In order for the apparent-
agency theory to apply, the plaintiff must first show that she thought the 
 
 44. See MedRetreat, Physicians, http://www.medretreat.com/procedures/physicians.html (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2007). 
 45. Tellingly, MedRetreat has since changed the statement that its partner facility physicians are 
trained according to the “same” standards and practices that exist in the U.S. with the less contentious 
statement that its partner facility physicians are trained according to international standards and 
practices that are “comparable” to those existing in the U.S. See MedRetreat, Physicians, 
http://www.medretreat.com/procedures/physicians.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2007). 
 46. See Havighurst, supra note 27, at 596. 
 47. See, e.g., Sloan v. Metro. Health Council, Inc., 516 N.E.2d 1104, 1109 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987). 
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physician was the actual agent of the hospital and that this belief was a 
reasonable one.48 Second, the hospital must have somehow acted to lead the 
plaintiff to believe the physician was its agent or at least have failed to give the 
plaintiff a contrary impression.49 Third, the hospital’s act or failure to act must 
have been the reason for the plaintiff’s mistaken impression that the physician 
was the hospital’s agent.50 
Hospitals have been held vicariously liable under an apparent-agency 
theory when the plaintiff proves that she looked to the hospital rather than to 
the physician for treatment. The prototypical example is when the plaintiff sues 
a hospital for emergency-room care since “the very nature of a medical 
emergency precludes [physician] choice.”51 A plaintiff can also establish 
apparent agency by proving that the hospital held itself out as the provider of 
care. Plaintiffs have thus relied on hospital advertising to establish their 
apparent agency claims.52 For example, in Pamperin v. Trinity Memorial 
Hospital, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held a hospital vicariously liable for the 
acts of physicians who were, in fact, independent contractors because the 
hospital had advertised itself as providing complete medical care.53 
Some courts have also been willing to hold MCOs vicariously liable when 
their subscribers rely on them, rather than on individual physicians, for care.54 
For example, in Boyd v. Einstein Medical Center, a Pennsylvania court found 
that an HMO could be held vicariously liable for the negligence of a physician 
on its plan when the plaintiff’s decedent “submitted herself to the care of the 
participating physicians in response to an invitation from HMO.”55 
Hospitals and MCOs have been able to limit vicarious liability claims, 
however, by requiring patients to acknowledge that their treating physicians are 
independent contractors.56 As Professor Havighurst has noted, “A recent review 
of heath plans’ contracts with their subscribers observes how MCO contracts 
and related literature frequently characterize the plans’ relationship with 
physicians in ways seemingly calculated to permit the plan later to deny 
responsibility for the quality of care provided.”57 
Courts are willing to find contractual waivers of responsibility effective to 
limit liability. 58  For example, in Espalin v. Children’s Medical Center of Dallas a 
 
 48. Mejia v. Cmty. Hosp., 99 Cal. App. 4th Supp. 1448, 1456–57 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). 
 49. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Sycamore Mun. Hosp., 622 N.E.2d 788, 796 (Ill. 1993) (holding that a 
hospital holds itself out as a provider of care if it fails to inform the patient otherwise). 
 50. See, e.g., James by James v. Ingalls Mem’l Hosp., 701 N.E.2d 207, 211 (Ill. 1998). 
 51. McGill v. Newark Surgery Ctr., 756 N.E.2d 762, 773 (Ohio C.P. 2001) (quoting Clark v. 
Southview Hosp. & Family Health Ctr., 628 N.E.2d 46, 53 (Ohio 1994)). 
 52. See, e.g., Pamperin v. Trinity Mem. Hosp., 423 N.W.2d 848, 849 (Wis. 1988). 
 53. Id. 
 54. See, e.g., Boyd v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 547 A.2d 1229, 1229, 1232 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988). 
 55. Id. at 1235 (denying summary judgment to HMO by finding “an issue of material fact as to 
whether the participating physicians were the ostensible agents of HMO.”). 
 56. See Havighurst, supra note 27, at 608. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Espalin v. Children’s Med. Ctr., 27 S.W.3d 675, 684–85 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000). 
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Texas court denied recovery against a hospital when the plaintiff’s parents had 
read and signed the hospital admission form stating that their daughter’s 
doctors were independent contractors.59  Contracts waiving MCO responsibility 
for physician negligence may also be valid.  MCOs generally give their clients 
more choices in selecting a physician, and the waivers are signed when the 
clients have time for cool reflection. 
A medical-tourism plaintiff attempting to hold the medical-tourism firm 
vicariously liable for the negligence of her foreign provider would likely rely on 
an apparent-agency theory.  Her claim would be supported by the fact that 
medical tourists look to firms to select their foreign providers.  Firms encourage 
this reliance through their advertising.  For example, MedRetreat promotes 
itself by telling prospective clients, 
You see, we’ve done all the legwork for you.  Through our due diligence process, 
we’ve traveled to these locations to carefully inspect, verify and select our business 
partners and their facilities. Only the best hospitals, hotels and destination program 
managers have met our stringent criteria and have been chosen to participate in this 
program.60 
Medical-tourism plaintiffs could argue that such statements signal to patients 
that the foreign providers are the firms’ agents and on that basis, the firms 
should be held vicariously liable for the foreign providers’ negligence. 
The firms would still probably escape liability, however, because they 
require medical tourists to sign agreements acknowledging the foreign 
providers’ independence. MedRetreat’s “Medical Tourism Agreement” 
cautions that MedRetreat “is not a medical referral service and does not 
endorse, recommend, or approve any travel agency or healthcare provider.”61 
Mediescapes India similarly warns its clients that it “does not control or operate 
any Treating Institution” and therefore is not responsible for a Treating 
Institution’s negligence.62  After Espalin, disclaimers like those made by 
MedRetreat and Mediescapes India are probably valid if voluntarily signed and 
may be sufficient to defeat a medical-tourism plaintiff’s claim that the medical-
tourism firm should be held vicariously liable based on the apparent agency 
theory.63 
 
 59. Id. (finding no error in granting summary judgment where the waiver stated that the physicians 
were not employees of the hospital). 
 60. See MedRetreat, supra note 21. 
 61. MedRetreat, Medical Tourism Agreement, http://www.medretreat.com/templates/UserFiles/ 
Documents/Medical%20Tourism%20Agreement%20-%20Jane%20Doe(1).pdf (last visited Apr. 16, 
2007). 
 62. See Mediescapes India, http://www.mediescapes.com/Legal_Issues_and_Risks.html (last visited 
Apr. 10, 2007). 
 63. See Espalin, 27 S.W.3d at 684–85 (although the discussion concerning waivers in Espalin was 
confined to the hospital context, courts will likely find that medical-tourism firms can similarly waive 
risks, especially since firms have even less control over doctors). 
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III 
CONFLICT OF LAW ISSUES 
A medical-tourism firm would likely try to dismiss a lawsuit against it on 
forum non conveniens grounds.  The firm would contend that the most 
appropriate forum for litigation would be the foreign country in which the 
surgery took place.  If its motion were denied, the firm would proceed to argue 
that the case should be governed by the foreign country’s laws. To some extent 
these issues overlap: a court’s decision to grant a motion for dismissal on 
grounds of forum non conveniens may be based in part on the potential for 
conflict of laws.64 
A. Forum Non Conveniens 
A plaintiff’s choice of venue is typically respected when it is the plaintiff’s 
home state.65  A court is also less likely to grant a forum non conveniens motion 
when the plaintiff’s choice of venue is located where the defendant has its 
principal place of business or is incorporated (presumptively convenient 
locations).66 But when the plaintiff brings suit in a foreign forum and the subject 
of the litigation arose outside that forum, the plaintiff’s choice will be given less 
deference.67 
In addition to considering the plaintiff’s and defendant’s residences, courts 
will also consider a number of public and private factors to determine what 
forum is most appropriate for the litigation.68  Private-interest factors include (1) 
the ease of access to evidence, (2) the availability of compulsory process to 
compel attendance of unwilling witnesses, and (3) the cost of willing witnesses’ 
attendance.69 
The private-interest factors have been invoked by courts to dismiss medical 
malpractice actions that arose overseas. For example, in Jeha v. Arabian 
American Oil Co., the cost of importing critical witnesses was a private-interest 
factor that led a federal district court sitting in Texas to dismiss a malpractice 
suit against a Saudi oil company. 70 Allegedly negligent treatment had been 
given by company doctors in Saudi Arabia, and critical evidence and witnesses 
 
 64. See infra text at note 89. 
 65. Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518, 524 (1947). 
 66. Stangvik v. Shiley Inc., 54 Cal.3d 744, 755–56 (Cal. 1991) (“[T]he presumption of convenience 
to a defendant which follows from its residence in California remains in effect . . . .”). However, the 
convenience of a state of incorporation or principal place of business is not always dispositive. See 
Ussery v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 647 A.2d 778, 781–82 (D.C. 1994) (holding that a Maryland 
plaintiff could not sue her health plan in the District of Columbia for malpractice that occurred in 
Maryland even though the defendant was incorporated in the District). 
 67. See, e.g., Gundlach v. Lind, 820 N.E.2d 1, 5, 6 (Ill. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that the circuit court 
abused its discretion in denying defendant’s motion to transfer venue when neither the plaintiffs nor 
the defendants resided in the county where the plaintiff brought suit and the acts giving rise to the 
litigation were also located outside the forum county). 
 68. See, e.g., Stangvik, 54 Cal.3d at 751.  
 69. Id. 
 70. 751 F. Supp. 122, 126, 128 (S.D. Tex. 1990). 
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were located overseas. 71 The court held that “to require these doctors to travel 
to Texas or to require the lawyers to go to them in Lebanon would be 
wasteful.”72  Moreover, “[d]octors should not be forced to “endure unnecessary, 
prolonged absences from their medical duties.”73 Finally, the court expressed 
concern as to whether it could compel the testimony of necessary foreign 
witnesses.74 
Two important public-interest factors in a forum non conveniens analysis 
are the local interest in resolving local controversies and the avoidance of 
difficult problems of a potential conflict of laws and the application of foreign 
law.75 In Gibbon v. American University of Beirut, a federal district court in New 
York dismissed a British plaintiff’s claim against a university incorporated in 
New York but having its principal place of business in Beirut for alleged 
malpractice that took place in Lebanon.76 The court determined that New 
York’s local interest in deciding cases involving companies incorporated in New 
York was inferior to Lebanon’s interest in adjudicating medical-malpractice 
claims that arose in Lebanon and involved Lebanese citizens.77 Additionally, the 
court held that, were it to try the case, its having to apply Lebanese law weighed 
heavily in favor of dismissal.78 The court quoted Judge Friendly’s cautionary 
advice about applying foreign law approvingly: 
[T]here is an inevitable hazard that, in those areas, perhaps interstitial but far from 
inconsequential, where we have no clear guides, our labors, moulded by our own 
habits of mind as they necessarily must be, may produce a result whose conformity 
with that of the foreign court may be greater in theory than it is in fact.79 
A court may grant a forum non conveniens motion when an alternative 
forum lies in a foreign country.80 The alternative forum must, however, be 
available and adequate.81  The forum is available if “all the necessary parties are 
amenable to its jurisdiction.”82 The forum is adequate if it allows the plaintiff 
“reasonable access to some legal remed[y].”83 The foreign forum need not have 
the same protections and benefits available to plaintiffs in the United States, 
but need only be capable of providing a remedy that is not “so clearly 
inadequate or unsatisfactory that it is no remedy at all.”84 
 
 71. Id. at 126. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 509 (1947). 
 76. Gibbon v. Am. Univ., 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13401, *1 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
 77. Id. at * 7. 
 78. Id. at *9. 
 79. Id. at *9 n.6 (quoting Judge Friendly in Conte v. Flota Mercante Del Esatado, 277 F.2d 664, 667 
(2d Cir. 1960)). 
 80. Jeha v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 751 F. Supp. 122, 128 (S.D. Tex. 1990). 
 81. Gibbon, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *10. 
 82. Jeha, 751 F. Supp. at 125. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 (1981). 
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Courts have been leery about pronouncing a foreign forum inadequate.85 
For example, in Banco Mercantil, a federal district court in Puerto Rico held 
that the Dominican Republic was an adequate alternative forum: “[It] is not the 
business of our courts to assume the responsibility for supervising the integrity 
of the judicial system of another sovereign nation.”86 
Foreign courts have been considered inadequate, however, when their 
justice systems are incapable of providing plaintiffs timely protection. For 
example, in Bhatnagar v. Surrendra Overseas Ltd., the Third Circuit refused to 
surrender a case to the Indian courts because of their notorious delays,87 holding 
that an alternative forum is inadequate when “the prospect of judicial remedy 
becomes so temporally remote that it is no remedy at all.”88 
Whether foreign courts should be deemed inadequate when they do not 
recognize certain doctrines that a plaintiff relies on for relief is case specific.  In 
one of the seminal decisions on the issue, Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno,89 the 
Supreme Court held that “the possibility of a change in law unfavorable to the 
plaintiff should not be given substantial weight” when the plaintiff still has the 
chance to recover in the foreign court.90  However, the Court cautioned that an 
unfavorable change in law may be given substantial weight when its application 
would entirely preclude the plaintiff from recovery.91  The deciding factor, 
therefore, is whether the doctrine that is unrecognized in the foreign court is 
truly vital to the plaintiff’s claim.  
It is often difficult to predict the outcome in cases where a foreign forum is 
challenged on the grounds that it does not recognize a theory vital to the 
plaintiff’s case.  For example, in In re CINAR Corp. Securities Litigation,92 a 
New York federal district court dismissed a securities class-action suit on forum 
non conveniens grounds despite the fact that the alternative forum, located in 
Canada, did not recognize the “fraud-on-the-market theory.”93 That many of the 
plaintiffs would have no basis for relief without the theory was an insufficient 
consideration for the court to retain the case.94  Yet, in a similar class-action suit, 
In Re Lernout and Hauspie Securities Litigation, 95 a Massachusetts federal 
district court found that Belgium was an inadequate forum, in part, because it 
did not recognize the fraud-on-the market theory.96 
 
 85. See, e.g., Banco Mercantil, S.A. v. Arencibia, 927 F. Supp. 565, 567–68 (D.P.R. 1995). 
 86. Id. (quoting Chesley v. Union Carbide Corp., 927 F.2d 60, 66 (2d Cir. 1991)). 
 87. Bhatnagar v. Surrendra Overseas Ltd., 52 F.3d 1220, 1227–28 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 88. Id. at 1228. 
 89. 454 U.S. at 249–55. 
 90. Id. at 252 n.19. 
 91. Id. at 254. 
 92. 186 F. Supp. 2d 279, 298–99 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 93. Id. at 298. 
 94. Id. 
 95. 208 F. Supp. 2d 74, 91–92 (D. Mass. 2002). 
 96. Id. at 92. The court was also persuaded to find that Belgium was an inadequate forum because 
Belgium lacks a class-action mechanism. Id. at 91. 
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The same forum non conveniens analysis would be applied to medical-
tourism cases. Assuming the long-arm statute of the plaintiff’s home state 
accommodated the suit, a medical-tourism firm’s motion to dismiss on forum 
non conveniens grounds would probably be denied if the plaintiff brought suit 
there since a plaintiff’s choice to sue in her home state is generally respected.97 
It is also more likely that the motion would be denied if the action was brought 
in the state where the firm was incorporated or had its principal place of 
business.98 Even if suit was brought in such a forum, however, the case could be 
dismissed because of overriding private interest factors, such as the ones 
articulated in Jeha v. Arabian American Oil Co.99 A court considering a medical-
tourism case would be similarly concerned about making foreign physicians, 
hospital staff, and hospital representatives travel to the United States for a 
lengthy trial.100 
The public-interest factors that courts consider in a forum non conveniens 
motion do not decisively favor either party. That a court would probably have 
to apply a foreign country’s law would support the motion to dismiss.101 On the 
other hand, American courts have a strong interest in hearing cases involving 
American citizens that allege American firms have committed tortious acts 
against them, even if their effects are felt elsewhere.102  
In considering a medical-tourism firm’s forum non conveniens motion, a 
court would have to decide whether the alternative forum for litigation was 
both available and adequate.103 The plaintiff could argue that the foreign forum 
would be incapable of providing her with an adequate remedy because it does 
not recognize theories such as corporate negligence or vicarious liability, which 
are vital to her cause of action. 104 The plaintiff could also claim that the foreign 
forum is inadequate because of flaws in its legal system. As in Bhatnagar, 
lengthy delays in the time it takes to proceed to trial could constitute proof of 
the foreign forum’s inadequacy.105 Alternatively, the plaintiff could contend that 
the foreign forum would be biased because it has an incentive to protect its 
medical-tourism industry. The defendant firm could counter, however, that a 
biased decision would actually harm the industry by turning away prospective 
medical tourists who are concerned about the ability to seek redress for 
malpractice in a foreign country. In the end, as in Banco Mercantil, a court 
might refuse to cast judgment on another country’s justice system.106 
 
 97. See supra text at note 65. 
 98. See supra text at note 66. 
 99. See Jeha v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 751 F. Supp. 122, 126 (S.D. Tex. 1990).  
 100. Id. 
 101. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 509 (1947).  
 102. Id. 
 103. E.g., Gibbon v. Am. Univ., 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13401, *10 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).  
 104. E.g., In re Lernout and Hauspie Secs. Litig., 208 F. Supp. 2d. 74, 91–92 (D. Mass. 2002). 
 105. Bhatnagar v. Surrendra Overseas Ltd., 52 F.3d 1220, 1227–28 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 106. Banco Mercantil, S.A. v. Arencibia, 927 F. Supp. 565, 567–68 (D.P.R. 1995). 
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B. Choice-of-Law Issues 
If a court decided that venue was proper, it would then have to decide what 
law would govern the medical-tourism case.  Although choice-of-law rules for 
medical-malpractice actions are not uniform among the states, they have 
substantial overlaps. 
In tort actions, states generally follow either the lex loci delicti approach, in 
which the law of the place of injury governs; the most “significant relationship 
test” adopted by the Restatement of Law—Conflict of Law (2d); or a state-
interest analysis, which examines which state has the greatest interest in the 
application of its laws.107  The Restatement Second approach, adopted by a 
substantial number of states, takes into account a number of factors including 
(1) the site of the injury; (2) the place where the conduct giving rise to injury 
occurred; (3) the parties’ residence, domicile, principal place of business, or 
state of incorporation; and (4) the place where the parties’ relationship is 
centered.108 
Most medical-malpractice actions follow the lex loci delicti approach, 
whereby the law governing the case is that of the state in which the operation 
occurred.109  For example, in Chadwick v. Arabian American Oil Co.,110  a federal 
district court in Delaware considered a medical-malpractice action brought by a 
Florida plaintiff alleging that an oil company incorporated in Delaware, with its 
principal place of business in Saudi Arabia, was vicariously liable for the 
negligence of the defendant company’s doctors. The court held that Saudi law 
applied because Delaware conflict-of-law principles were governed by lex loci 
delicti and the plaintiff alleged that he had been misdiagnosed in Saudi 
Arabia.111  The court in Chadwick dismissed the action because Saudi law did 
not recognize vicarious liability.112 
The Restatement test and the state interest inquiry often yield the same 
result as the lex loci delicti approach to conflict of law issues in medical 
malpractice actions. In Blakesley v. Wolford,113 the Third Circuit used both 
approaches in deciding to apply the laws of Texas rather than those of 
Pennsylvania to a medical-malpractice action.114 During a visit to Pennsylvania, 
a Texas dentist had advised the plaintiff to undergo oral surgery; she 
subsequently did so, in Texas, then returned to Pennsylvania.115 The court 
rejected the plaintiff’s argument that because Pennsylvania was the state in 
 
 107. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 145 (1971). 
 108. Id. 
 109. See Shirley A. Wiegand, Fifty Conflict of Laws “Restatements”: Merging Judicial Discretion and 
Legislative Endorsement, 65 LA. L. REV. 1, 39–40 (2004) (quoting Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of 
Law in the American Courts in 2003: Seventeenth Annual Survey, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 9, 33 (2004)). 
 110. Chadwick v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 656 F. Supp. 857, 858 (D. Del. 1987). 
 111. Id. at 860. 
 112. Id. at 860–61. 
 113. 789 F.2d 236 (3d Cir. 1986). 
 114. Id. at 239. 
 115. Id. 
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which she felt the effects of the operation, the injury had taken place in 
Pennsylvania rather than Texas.116 The court also refused to consider the place 
where the initial consultation and diagnosis were made (Pennsylvania) as the 
place where the conduct causing injury occurred.117 It held that the only relevant 
conduct occurred in Texas since that was where the alleged negligence 
occurred.118 Concluding that Texas’s interest in protecting its physicians trumped 
Pennsylvania’s interest in protecting its citizens that voluntary travel out of 
state for medical care,119 the court applied Texas law to the case. 
In the context of medical tourism, as in that for medical malpractice 
generally, a court using the lex loci delicti approach to conflict-of-law questions 
would apply the law of the country in which the medical tourist’s operation 
occurred.  If a court followed the Blakesley decision, it would decline an 
invitation to find that the place of the medical-tourism plaintiff’s injury was the 
state where she felt the effects of the surgery.120 
Similarly, foreign law would probably govern under the Restatement test.121 
The first and second prongs of that approach clearly favor foreign law since the 
foreign country would be the site where the injury and the conduct directly 
causing the injury occurred. The third and fourth parts of the Restatement test 
weigh against using foreign law: a medical-tourism firm’s principal place of 
business and place of incorporation are in the United States, as is the 
relationship between a medical tourist and the firm.122  However, where the 
relationship is centered may not weigh heavily in a court’s analysis since most of 
the transactions in medical tourism occur over the internet or telephone. 
It is unclear how a court hearing a medical-tourism malpractice case would 
rule on choice of law if it used a state-interest approach. A nation has an 
interest in deterring domestic firms from taking advantage of vulnerable 
medical tourists. If the host nation is unable to prevent its firms from engaging 
in opportunistic behavior, it is unlikely that any other country could do so. 
Foreign countries may lack jurisdiction over the host-nation’s firms and may be 
unable or unwilling to regulate them. Foreign countries nonetheless have an 
interest in medical-malpractice actions that arise within their borders. This 
interest would be strengthened if citizens of the foreign country were joined as 
defendants in the case. 
 
 116. Id. at 241. 
 117. Id. at 242. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 243. 
 120. See id. at 241. 
 121. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS, supra note 107.  
 122. See Chadwick v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 656 F. Supp. 857, 858 (D. Del. 1987). 
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IV 
PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
The legal challenges that medical-tourism plaintiffs would encounter in 
stating  claims against medical-tourism firms in the United States may be at 
odds with good public policy. Although a case may be made that it is too 
premature to impose stricter liability standards on medical-tourism firms, the 
status quo may not sufficiently deter firms from taking advantage of their 
vulnerable clients by partnering with substandard foreign providers. 
A. The Case for Stricter Liability Standards 
Public policy favors holding firms legally accountable for the negligent acts 
of foreign providers. First, medical tourists’ particular vulnerability in the area 
of international health-care makes it prudent for the law not to defer to caveat 
emptor principles. Many medical tourists are uninsured whereas others are in 
need of surgery not offered within the United States.123 These tourists have little 
choice but to engage in medical tourism, which makes it difficult for them to 
fully appreciate the risks. 
Second, public policy favors placing liability on the firms because they have 
a substantial information advantage over their clients.124 The firms’ marketing 
material emphasizes the hundreds of thousands of dollars they spend 
investigating the quality of their foreign partners.125 Clearly, medical tourists 
lack the resources to independently evaluate the reputations of foreign 
providers whose selection is the main purpose of medical-tourism firms. 
Third, public policy favors placing liability on firms because they are the 
better cost avoider. Firms have the ability to exert influence on the foreign 
providers and thereby reduce the frequency of malpractice. For example, firms 
could set quality standards to which foreign partners would have to adhere in 
order to stay on the firms’ networks. Firms could also hire teams of 
independent inspectors consisting of respected U.S. physicians to inspect the 
foreign hospitals and their physicians.  
Finally, public policy favors imposing liability on firms because they may be 
the only source of redress for a medical tourist who is the victim of malpractice. 
U.S. courts probably lack jurisdiction over the foreign providers,126 and the 
courts of the country where the malpractice occurred may also be unwilling or 
unable to hear suits against them.127 Not only is the medical-tourism plaintiff 
harmed by her inability to obtain a remedy to right the wrong that has been 
 
 123. See 60 Minutes Story, supra note 2 (explaining that many medical tourists receive treatments 
not covered under their insurance or not FDA approved). 
 124. For the parallel argument in the MCO context see Havighurst, supra note 27, at 618 (arguing 
MCOs are “in a position to make quality a desideratum in selecting specialists”). 
 125. See, e.g., MedRetreat Press Release, supra note 22. 
 126. See supra text at Part II.A. 
 127. In India, for example, the delays in judicial proceedings are notorious. See supra text at note 87. 
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done to her, but future medical tourists are also disadvantaged by the inability 
of courts to deter future negligence through the imposition of liability. 
Current liability standards are not sufficient to hold firms fully accountable 
for the negligence of foreign providers. Firms will not be held vicariously liable 
if they distance themselves from their overseas partners because vicarious 
liability presently turns on the ability (real or apparent) of the firms to control 
the providers.128 Without the threat of liability, firms have less of an incentive to 
select the best foreign hospitals for their networks. Instead, they can take 
advantage of uninformed medical tourists by contracting with inferior 
providers. 
B. The Case against Stricter Liability Standards 
Firms would argue, first, that changing the existing legal regime is 
unnecessary. At this early stage in the industry, there is no evidence indicating 
that firms take advantage of their clients. This stands in contrast to MCOs, in 
which examples of opportunistic behavior are rife.129 Moreover, firms would 
argue that opportunistic behavior will not develop in the medical-tourism 
industry because firms compete vigorously on the issue of safety. Whereas 
MCOs take pains to distance themselves from the providers on their panels,130 
firms boast about the steps they have taken to ensure their clients receive top-
quality care.131 Since market forces already demand that firms act as loyal agents 
for their clients, creating liability rules designed to achieve that objective would 
be superfluous. 
If the medical-tourism industry were fully transparent and medical tourists 
had perfect information, the market’s invisible hand would be a strong 
deterrent against firms’ engaging in opportunistic behavior.  The reality is, 
however, that medical tourists have just as little information about medical-
tourism firms as they do about foreign providers.  The industry is simply too 
new.132 Thus, at least in the short term, market forces will be ineffective in 
weeding out the less-reputable firms. 
Second, firms may contend that stricter liability standards are unnecessary 
because firms that select incompetent providers can already be held liable for 
corporate negligence. Consequently, the current legal regime gives firms 
sufficient incentive to ensure that they work only with quality providers. 
The flaw with this argument is two-fold.  To begin with, it is not clear 
whether courts would accept the corporate-negligence theory of liability in the 
medical-tourism context.133 Yet even if they did, corporate negligence is not a 
 
 128. See Clark C. Havighurst, Vicarious Liability: Relocating Responsibility for the Quality of 
Medical Care, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 23 (2000). 
 129. See Havighurst, supra note 27, at 591–95. 
 130. Id. at 594–95. 
 131. See, e.g., MedRetreat, Why MedRetreat, supra note 24. 
 132. MedRetreat, for example, has only been in existence since 2003.  MedRetreat, supra note 21. 
 133. See discussion supra, Part II.B.1. 
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panacea for the problem of firms engaging in opportunistic behavior. The 
reasons why a pure negligence regime underdeters negligent conduct is well 
documented in the health-care field, and those reasons appear applicable to 
medical tourism.134 Because corporate-negligence actions against firms, like 
malpractice actions against physicians themselves, would be expensive and 
time-consuming, firms could count on a substantial number of victimized 
medical-tourism clients to settle for low amounts or not to sue at all.135 In 
addition, because proving corporate negligence requires plaintiffs to show that 
the foreign providers had such a poor track record that the firms should have 
known not to partner with them, 136 a number of plaintiffs with valid claims will 
lose at trial.137 
Consequently, firms would not have to fully compensate all plaintiffs with 
valid malpractice claims and therefore it would be economically rational for 
them to select inferior providers and to underinvest in quality control. Stricter 
liability standards are needed to make firms internalize the costs of deciding not 
to act as loyal agents for their clients. 
Third, firms would defend the current liability regime by arguing that it 
appropriately places responsibility for malpractice on the foreign providers. If 
firms were always held liable for the negligence of their foreign partners, then 
those partners would lack an incentive to provide better care. 
This argument, too, is flawed. The assumption that increasing physicians’ 
liability risks will motivate them to provide better care has been heavily 
criticized.138 Physicians are covered by malpractice insurance and, as Professor 
Havighurst observes, the insurance “is generally not priced so that future 
premiums reflect the physician’s actual claims experience.”139 Although the 
insurance system in the country where the physician practices may not be as 
effective at softening the impact of malpractice claims, there are other reasons 
to believe that direct actions against the foreign providers are not an effective 
deterrence mechanism. As Professor Havighurst notes, for example, physicians 
may be in “psychological denial” about the connection between malpractice 
actions and the quality of their care.140 
Finally, firms would argue against stricter liability standards on the grounds 
that higher standards could cripple the infant industry. Their contention would 
be that the number of firms offering to guide the tourists through the process 
would diminish and that those firms that could afford to pay out large damage 
awards would pass the costs along to their clients. Since medical tourism’s main 
 
 134. See, e.g., Jeffrey O’Connell & James F. Neale, HMO’s, Cost Containment, and Early Offers: 
New Malpractice Threats and a Proposed Reform, 14 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 287, 296–98 
(1998). 
 135. Id. at 294. 
 136. See supra Part II. 
 137. O’Connell & Neale, supra note 134, at 294. 
 138. See, e.g., Havighurst, supra note 128, at 18–19. 
 139. Id. at 18. 
 140. Id. 
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attraction is the cost savings, many medical tourists would then simply forego 
the firms’ services. 
Of course, if stricter liability standards actually did send firms out of 
business or made them prohibitively expensive to use, public-policy objectives 
in encouraging such firms would be defeated. Firms play an important role in 
the medical-tourism industry since medical tourists are ill-equipped to identify 
reputable foreign providers on their own. Yet it is not clear that subjecting firms 
to higher liability standards would necessarily impede their growth. First, firms 
may become more attractive to medical tourists if they are held liable for 
compensation in the event of malpractice. In essence, firms would serve as 
limited insurance providers. Second, the firms would probably not go out of 
business if they raised their prices to reflect their higher costs. The cost savings 
associated with medical tourism would remain substantial and tourists would 
likely continue to pay for a firm’s expertise in the field. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the growth of the medical-tourism industry, information on the 
quality of the foreign providers is sparse. Consequently, medical-tourism firms 
with expertise in the business are valuable intermediaries. As a result of their 
information advantage over the public, however, these firms are in a position to 
engage in opportunistic behavior. 
The best way to deter firms from taking advantage of their positions would 
be to hold them vicariously liable for the malpractice of their foreign partners. 
This would create an incentive, stemming from a legal duty, for the firms to 
select the best providers and exercise adequate supervision over them. 
However, the current legal regime is a long way off from this ideal. As this 
article has demonstrated, firms have enough defenses to malpractice actions 
that they will rarely be held accountable for failing to act in their clients’ best 
interests. 
Legislation should be introduced to regulate medical tourism. The industry 
presents myriad complex policy issues that need to be resolved.  For example, 
MCOs could begin offering deeply discounted plans whereby patients will be 
insured only for operations performed in foreign countries. The question of 
whether such plans should be permitted is not too premature in light of the 
recent decision by Blue Cross Blue Shield to insure its first medical tourist, a 
three-year-old boy who went to India to receive care for a heart problem.141 
In determining whether to restrict the activities of businesses connected to 
the medical-tourism industry, legislators will need to weigh the virtues 
associated with freedom of contract against the need to protect vulnerable 
medical tourists. The level of paternalism reflected in medical-tourism 
 
 141. M. Dinesh Varma, Insured in U.S., Treated in India, THE HINDU, Feb. 8, 2006, available at 
http://www.hindu.com/2006/02/08/stories/2006020817240300.htm. 
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regulations should parallel the transparency of the industry.  As more 
information about medical-tourism becomes available, there will be less need to 
protect medical tourists. 
